Translation as Listening and Encounter with the Other in Migration and Globalization Processes Today by Petrilli, Susan & Ponzio, Augusto
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Translation as Listening and Encounter with the Other in Migration and Globalization Processes
Today"
 
Susan Petrilli et Augusto Ponzio
TTR : traduction, terminologie, rédaction, vol. 19, n° 2, 2006, p. 191-223.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/017829ar
DOI: 10.7202/017829ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 10 février 2017 03:34
 191
 
 
 
Translation as Listening and 
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Processes Today 
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Augusto Ponzio 
 
 
 
Premise  
 
This essay is part of an ongoing research project by the authors on the 
problem of rights and differences and on interrelated interlinguistic, 
intersemiotic and ideological problems of translation. Of the numerous 
publications which have ensued from this project some have been 
signaled in the reference section below. The present essay is divided 
into three main sections. 
 
 The first, entitled “The task and the mask of the translator,” by 
Susan Petrilli, analyses the connection between translating and 
interpreting and the semiotic and linguistic implications involved. 
Particular reference is made to the question of translator discourse 
genre.  
 
 The section entitled “Listening and wanting to hear in 
translation,” by Augusto Ponzio, examines the difference between 
listening and wanting to hear. Listening is understood as opening 
towards the other; instead, wanting to hear as englobing the other. 
Wanting to hear the other implies silence; listening does not imply 
silence or muteness, but what (with a quasi neologism) we may call 
taciturnity, that is, irony, indirect discourse, responsive understanding, 
and openness to the other. Translation always implies encounter not 
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only among different languages but also among different cultures, and 
can be oriented as listening or as wanting to hear. The difference is a 
difference of attitude towards the other with implications of the 
ideological and political orders. All this emerges, for example, in 
relation to today’s migration and globalization processes. Listening is 
connected with hospitality. Instead, wanting to hear aims to distinguish, 
classify, reduce to identity, define, judge. This generally occurs on the 
basis of categories intended to defend one’s own rights to the 
disadvantage of the rights and viewpoints of others. 
  
 The third section entitled “Semioethics of translation,” by 
Susan Petrilli, develops this perspective and evidences the ethical 
character of translation understood as listening, showing how from this 
perspective the translator’s responsibility becomes responsibility for 
the other. The translator must account to the other and for the other. 
Therefore, the translator carries out a role of fundamental importance in 
the encounter between languages, signs and cultures, which involve 
processes of migration and globalization. This type of responsibility is 
neither specialized nor technical, but ethical and global, given that 
whether we like it or not even the person most distant from us is our 
neighbour in one way or another. We may also call this type of 
responsibility “semioethic responsibility” given that it concerns signs 
finalized to acknowledging the rights of others, and not to asserting 
one’s own identity and one’s own rights over others.  
 
1. The task and the mask of the translator (by Susan Petrilli) 
 
In its most obvious sense translation concerns verbal texts in their 
relation between different languages. But even if we remain within the 
sphere of verbal signs, translation does not only concern the relation 
between one language and another, but also among the different 
languages forming the same language given that all languages are 
endowed to a lesser or greater degree with internal plurilingualism. 
Furthermore, translation occurs between verbal languages and non-
verbal languages, and vice versa, as well as among non-verbal 
languages without referring to verbal language (if not implicitly). 
Understood in such terms, the problem of translation obviously cannot 
be restricted to the field of linguistics, but must concern semiotics, the 
general science of signs.  
 
 Before being the object of semiotics, translation is a sign 
operation. In other words, translation occurs among signs, and cannot 
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be reduced to the linguistic-verbal order alone. Translation invests the 
sign sphere in its entirety. Where there are signs and semiosic 
processes, there is translation. A semiotic approach to the problem of 
translation–if we must identify fields and boundaries–does not limit its 
focus to verbal language, but rather extends its gaze to all human 
languages, verbal and non-verbal, therefore to the anthroposemiosic 
sphere in its totality. 
 
 Victoria Welby (1837-1912) describes mankind’s capacity for 
signification in terms of “translative thinking,” an automatic process 
“in which everything suggests or reminds us of something else” 
(Welby, 1983, p. 34). Translated into semiotic terms we could say that 
translative thinking is a semiosic process in which something stands for 
something else, in which different sign systems are related, in which 
one sign is more fully developed, enriched, criticized, put at a distance, 
placed between inverted commas, parodied or simply imitated, and, in 
any case, interpreted in terms of another sign. Translation is a method 
of investigation and discovery, says Welby, a method for the 
verification and acquisition of knowledge and for the development of 
critical consciousness: 
 
 As language involves both unity and distinction (the one actually and 
the other implicitly), language must itself be recognised as a means of 
discovering contrasts together with the links which constitute these 
elements of unity, or at least completely exclude the idea of final 
disparateness ... For a thing is significant, both in the lower and in the 
higher sense, in proportion as it is expressible through bare sign or 
pictorial symbol or representative action. In the higher sense (that of 
vital or moral or rational import) it is significant in proportion as it is 
capable of expressing itself in, or being translated into, more and 
more phases of thought or branches of science. The more varied and 
rich our employment of signs ..., the greater our power of inter-
relating, inter-translating, various phases of thought, and thus of 
coming closer and closer to the nature of things in the sense of 
starting-points for the acquisition of fresh knowledge, new truth. 
(Welby, 1983, p. 150) 
 
 We could develop such intuitions in the light of more recent 
studies in language theory and the science of signs generally and state 
that semiosis, that is, the situation in which something functions as a 
sign, cannot subsist without translation, for semiosis is a translation-
interpretation process. The role of translation is fundamental to the 
constitution of the sign itself, both verbal and non-verbal, in the 
determination of meaning itself. The intimate connection between signs 
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and translation is particularly evident when we place the category of 
replaceability as a necessary condition for signhood, that is, when the 
sign is considered not only as something that replaces something else, 
but as something that may also in turn be replaced by something else 
(see Ponzio, 1981, pp. 15-42). And meaning may be defined as a class 
of verbal and non-verbal signs which may replace each other 
reciprocally in semiosic processes in which an interpretant sign 
replaces a previous interpreted sign which it somehow develops. As 
Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) teaches us, a sign subsists thanks to 
another sign acting as its interpretant, so that its meaning is its 
translation into another sign. The sign flourishes in relations of 
reciprocal translation and substitution among signs with respect to 
which the original sign is never given autonomously and antecedently. 
 
 The problem of the interconnection between interpretation, 
translation, and alterity cannot be ignored by translation semiotics. The 
journal Athanor (University of Bari, Italy) has dedicated a trilogy of 
collective volumes, edited by myself, to translation (essays are mostly 
in English). The third issue was published in 2001 under the title Lo 
stesso altro (The Same Other). The paradox of translation is 
determined by the fact that the text must remain the same, while 
becoming other simply because it has been reorganized into the 
expressive modalities of another sign complex. The translation (target) 
text is at once identical to and different from the translated (source) 
text. 
 
 From this perspective, translation is a form of reported 
discourse, a form of discourse reporting the discourse of the other. 
Reporting discourse, that is, translator discourse is masked as direct 
discourse, as authorial discourse, in other words, translator discourse is 
not evidenced as such. On the contrary, it is erased–or, better, this is the 
claim. The aim is to allow the person whose discourse is reported to 
speak directly. Under this aspect, translation resembles direct discourse, 
because it cancels all traces of reporting discourse. It ensues that the 
reader of the translated text believes that the task of the translator is not 
to interpret, comment, or resort to expedients that trace boundaries 
between his/her own word and the word of the other (such as citation 
marks or dashes). The reader believes that the translator is completely 
transparent. And what the reader perceives is the word of the original 
author, only that this word is now in the same language as the reader’s 
(a true miracle!).  
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 As indirect discourse masked as direct discourse, translation is 
a kind of dramatization. In other words, the same thing happens in 
translation as occurs in drama. Just as the author of a theatrical text 
makes his/her characters speak directly, while his/her own word as 
author does not emerge (if not in some prescription for the mise en 
scène), in translation the translator’s word, the word that reports the 
other’s discourse (the original author’s discourse) in another language 
is silenced: the translator’s word is expected to converge with the direct 
word of the person whose discourse is translated. Translator discourse 
claims to be merely the discourse of the other, the author, reported 
discourse that speaks in the direct form. The translator aims to 
completely eliminate any traces of his/her own voice as translator, as 
interpreter, as reporter. This is not mystification but a form of 
abnegation, or empathy, identification of the translator’s word with the 
author’s, to the point of disappearing. This is the attitude that the reader 
demands from the translator: the reader expects the translator to act as a 
mere mouthpiece, a mechanical transformer, convertor. If the translator 
deserves to be mentioned in the translation-text, whether marginally or 
emphatically, this is always in his/her role as simple mouthpiece, in 
which s/he excels the more s/he denies him/herself. Of two voices, one 
only must remain, the voice of the original author now resounding in 
the target language: this is in the tradition of what is generally 
considered as a good translation. 
 
 In the case of indirect discourse, one’s own word and the word 
of the other are clearly distinct and flourish together in a dialogic 
relation which may vary from simple exposition, deferent and 
obsequious indication, even appeal to the authority of an author in the 
form of ipse dixit, through to citation of another’s text for critical 
discussion and eventual rejection even. On the contrary, in translation 
the aim is to eliminate traces of one’s own word (the translator’s): the 
word of the other is the only one recognized. We could make the claim 
that the sole function of the translation text (target text) in relation to 
the original text (source text) is of an ostensive order: the translation 
text limits itself to indicating the original-text, to showing it. From this 
perspective, translation completely draws away from the practice of 
reporting the other’s discourse in the form of indirect discourse where 
reporting discourse is not only obliged to manifest itself, but must also 
carry out an analytical function towards reported discourse. In the case 
of indirect discourse, reporting discourse must necessarily explain, 
clarify, explicate the sense of reported discourse and more or less 
explicitly mark its own position towards it. On the contrary, the 
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ostensive function of the translator implies that the original text subsists 
without interventions, is presented for what it is. In this case, the claim 
is that interpretive discourse is one thing, and translator discourse is 
another, that is, merely ostensive discourse. In reality, ostensive 
discourse does not exist if not in the form of direct discourse: the only 
real possibility of ostensive discourse for the translator would be to 
report the text as it is, in the original language, as Borges’s Pierre 
Menard rightly did. 
 
 To translate is inevitably to interpret, and the translator is no 
more than one of the many masks that the author of a text can wear. 
This mask is that of a “faithful mouthpiece” that neither critically 
interprets, nor analyses, nor discusses, nor takes a standpoint, but 
simply reports, and does so faithfully. In other words, among the 
various forms of reported discourse, translation is a sui generis form of 
indirect discourse which presents itself in the “masked” form of direct 
discourse. But we all know that this mask is a deception: traduttore 
traditore! But the translator is traditore only because an impossible 
fidelity is required of him/her. The translator is not a traditore, but 
simply an interpreter, one of the possible interpreters of the text.  
 
 The modalities (with internal differences) of reported 
discourse foreseen by historical-natural languages include: direct 
discourse, indirect discourse and free indirect discourse. In line with 
our discussion, we can now add a fourth modality: reported discourse 
in the form of translation from the source language to the target 
language. 
 
 Translation is indirect discourse if by indirect discourse is 
understood discourse that analyzes, interprets, explicates, clarifies, 
solves ambiguities, decides on senses, establishes the intonation, 
orientation, intent according to which something is pronounced. And 
no doubt the translator does all this. Reporting discourse is pervasive, 
omniscient in the form of reported discourse, to the point that all 
syntactical and punctuation indicators which distinguish the translator’s 
word from the word that is translated are eliminated. Consequently, if 
free indirect discourse is direct discourse masked as indirect discourse, 
translation is indirect discourse masked as direct discourse. 
 
 As indirect discourse masked as direct discourse, as 
explanation and unfolding of the word of the other, translation cannot 
be deferent, if not hypocritically, towards the word in translation; the 
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translating word cannot consider the word in translation as an 
authoritative word protected by boundaries, an inaccessible word, a 
word that withdraws from contact, closed in an attitude of haughty self-
sufficiency. Similarly to indirect discourse and to free indirect 
discourse, the translating word is a word that necessarily attracts and 
involves the word in translation, the translated word, in a relation of 
dialogic interaction. The word in translation cannot be cited 
respectfully. On the contrary, it inevitably enters an interpretive game 
and becomes part of a relation of dialogic involvement. Its pretentious 
claim to autonomy, identity and belonging to the author of the so-called 
“original” should be uncovered for what it is. In truth, the translating 
word is imbued with dialogism, similarly to the word of the author 
from the very beginning, which to become such had to enter a relation 
of dialogic involvement with other words, with the word of the other. 
 
 Translation restores the word with its constitutive dialogism 
with respect to other words. But not only: translation restores 
historical-natural languages and their special languages with their 
constitutive dialogism in relation to other historical-natural languages 
and other special languages. 
 
 The implications of this claim are the following: in principle, 
translation among different historical-natural languages is no different 
from translation within a single language. In both cases interpretive and 
explanatory processes are at work. To the question, “what do you 
mean?, explain yourself better,” we can just as easily reply by 
reformulating the utterance in the same historical-natural language, or 
in a different one: this will simply depend on the relation among 
speakers with regard to the different special languages and historical-
natural languages. In any case, it is a question of reformulation that 
necessarily specifies sense and orients interpretation. When 
reformulating one’s own discourse or someone else’s discourse in the 
same historical-natural language, eventually using a different special 
language, it is common practice to introduce expressions which signal 
indirect discourse: “I mean that..,” “she means that...,” “what I mean is 
that...,” “what she means is that...,” etc... Analogously, to use similar 
expressions in the case of interlingual translation should seem just as 
normal, eventually even transforming first person into third person, 
“It’s cold,” “She says it’s cold,” or “How are you?,” “She wants to 
know how you are’. And even if such expressions are not used 
explicitly, they are certainly implied. Though presented in the form of 
direct discourse, translation is no doubt indirect discourse. 
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 But there’s more. As says Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1895-1975), 
considering that words are taken from the mouths of others, even direct 
speech in a given historical-natural language is, in reality, indirect 
speech (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). Direct speech is always 
the discourse of others reported as “one’s own,” or at least discourse 
that must work hard to establish itself as “one’s own,” discourse that 
must make its way in discourse that was originally someone else’s. 
This makes discourse in translation from one historical-natural 
language to another very similar to reformulated discourse in the same 
language. Such reformulation in its various forms, including those 
identified as one’s own discourse, may range from imitation to 
parodization to caricature to more or less obvious, or more or less 
hidden controversy. 
 
 Translative processes are active not only in all forms of 
discourse–which is always interpretation, reformulation, reported 
discourse, indirect discourse–, but also in all single historical-natural 
languages given that interlingual translation is part of their very 
constitution. A historical-natural language is predisposed for 
translation, for the word of others, for the other word; it is prone to 
translation because it flourishes on translation, in relations with others, 
with other languages. This is the case with respect to its internal special 
languages as well as externally in relation to other historical-natural 
languages. This problematic is of central importance for the question of 
translatability. 
 
2. Listening and wanting to hear in translation (by Augusto Ponzio) 
 
We may state that semiotics understood as a general theory of signs is 
not separable from a theory of translation, of interpretation, of 
transposition of discourse of the other, and vice versa. From this point 
of view, semiotics is semiotics of listening and translation is listening. 
The methodics of sign interpretation as well as the methodics of 
translation is a methodics of listening. Listening has, in this context, a 
double sense: 1) listening as it may be used in the context of music; and 
2) listening as it is implied in medical semeiotics, in symptomatology 
(auscultation).  
 
 In translation, listening is an interpretant of answering 
comprehension, a disposition for hospitality towards the signs of 
others, of the other person, a disposition for welcoming signs of the 
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other into the house of the target language. In semiotics listening is an 
interpretant of a disposition for welcoming signs into the house of 
semiotics that are other than verbal signs: signs that are other to such a 
high degree that we can only denominate them in the negative. We are 
alluding to so-called non-verbal signs, the non-verbal cultural system of 
signs. Here, listening is analogous to listening in a musical 
performance. 
 
 But if we understand listening in the second sense, listening 
takes on the meaning of auscultation, in the sense of medical semeiotics 
or symptomatology: semiotics and translation theory and practice today 
must listen to the symptoms of today’s globalized world and identify 
the different expressions of unease and disease–in social relations, 
international relations, in the life of individuals, in the environment, in 
life generally over the entire planet. The aim is to make a diagnosis of 
today’s globalized world to which production, interpretation and 
translation of texts and utterances belong. Interpretation and translation 
are not possible, or are possible in terms that are inadequate, without 
listening in this second sense. From this point of view interpretation of 
sign and translation are listening, are turned to listening, but this time in 
the sense of medical semeiotics or symptomatology. The two meanings 
of “listening” are inseparable: the first is listening related to a specific, 
unique utterance or text, the second is listening related to social 
context, to the situation of encounter and interaction among different 
contexts, different languages, as a consequence of globalization and 
migration processes. To read in this context means to read today’s 
global world organization, to listen and criticize structural aspects of 
today’s globalization. 
 
 Homologation of the communicative universe reduces 
listening to wanting to hear (connected with silence). It diminishes the 
spaces of taciturnity where the freedom of listening is as necessary as 
the freedom of speech. 
 
  The words “silence” and “taciturnity” as we define them here 
correspond to the Russian words “тишинa” and “молчание’, as used 
by Bakhtin (1970-71). Bakhtin distinguishes between the conditions for 
perceiving a sound, the conditions for recognizing a verbal sign, 
therefore its meaning, and the conditions for understanding the sense 
(and not only meaning) of an utterance. Silence belongs to the first two, 
that is, to the conditions for perceiving a sound, and the conditions for 
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recognizing a sign in its meaning. Instead, taciturnity concerns the 
conditions for understanding sense. 
 
 Homologation of the communicative universe concretely 
invests the verbal sign with the conventional characteristics of the 
signal alone, or with the natural characteristics of sound. From the 
necessity of the natural to the repetition of the conventional, or, as 
Peirce says, from indexicality to symbolicity: such is the sphere 
reserved for the sign which thus loses its ambivalence, ductility, 
possibility of interpretants as characterized by originality, autonomy, 
absolute otherness—all qualities attributed by Peirce to iconicity. 
Enclosed within the universe of silence and the constriction of speech 
according to laws, conventions and habits, the sign loses its character 
as a challenge, as a provocation to identity and the closed totality; the 
sign loses its ability to question what seems stable and definitive as 
though it were endowed with the characters of naturality. All this can 
only be accomplished by the sign by upholding taciturnity, by tacitly 
refusing to collaborate with the closed universe of discourse, by 
escaping monologism, by exceeding the logic of equal exchange 
between the signifier and the signified, between the interpreted sign and 
the interpretant sign. “The disturbance of quietude by sound is 
mechanical and physiological [...]. Silence is possible only in the 
human world”, says Bakhtin (1970-71, pp. 133-34). The authors of the 
present essay prefer to translate with the term “silence” that which is 
intended by “quietude” and with “taciturnity” that which is intended by 
“silence.” The sign’s constriction within the space of silence, its 
separation from taciturnity and from the freedom of listening, from 
listening open to polysemy, denies the sign its human character and 
renders it mechanical and natural, causing it to oscillate between the 
conventionality of the signal and the naturality of sound, the naturality 
of what does not claim sense.  
 
 Silence belongs to the sphere of language as a system, to 
language as reiteration, as reproduction of the order of discourse 
(Foucault). Taciturnity, instead, belongs to the sphere of the 
unrepeatable utterance, it participates in the “unfinalized totality of the 
logosphere” (Bakhtin 1970-71, p. 134). Taciturnity enables the 
utterance to escape the inquiring, coercive silence of the linguistic 
system whose fascist character, as Roland Barthes (1978) says, does 
not lie in the fact that it impedes speech but, on the contrary, in the fact 
that it compels it, imposing the repetition of fixed meanings sanctioned 
by the order of discourse. Silence imposes speaking but is not listening. 
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Taciturnity is listening and as responsive listening it constitutes a pause 
in the unrepeatable utterance. Silence is the system of language 
intended as a “closed discourse universe” (Marcuse, 1974, ch. 1, 
para. 4). It abolishes listening which belongs to historical 
unrepeatability and to the open, unfinalized totality of the logosphere. 
Listening is one thing, wanting to hear is another: listening allows us to 
speak and to choose what we want to say, it allows for manifestation 
and is turned to signs in their constitutive multi-voicedness and 
contradictoriness; to want to hear compels us to speak, imposes 
univocality, relevance to questions, coherence, noncontradiction (see 
also Barthes and Havas, 1977, p. 989).  
 
 In all forms of society the realization, management and 
reproduction of power is achieved through control over the 
communication system. However, this has only clearly emerged 
recently. In the current phase of globalization, dominion is obviously 
not achieved through the possession of things but through control over 
communication relations. More simply, we could say, with Ferruccio 
Rossi-Landi, author of the monograph Language as Work and Trade 
(see Rossi-Landi, 1968), that the ruling class is the class that possesses 
capital. But the expression “capital” must now be specified in terms of 
communication control. If in mercantile exchange in general the 
“arcanum” of merchandise is identifiable by going back to 
communication relations between humans, now, more than ever before, 
in today’s global system, production is communication. With the 
expansion of capitalism, the market has realized its tendency to become 
a world market, and communication has also achieved worldwide 
dissemination. This means that all communication programs are part of 
a single global project which coincides with the plan for the 
development of capital. This plan is grounded in the reality itself of 
capital, so that the ideology of capital is its own logic. 
 
 The consequence is unitary, compact, monologic 
communication oriented towards a single, dominant point of view; an 
orientation which forces us to speak according to a given logic and 
which imposes silence. As observed elsewhere, it is not so much a 
question of the end of ideology as of the fact that dominant ideology is 
able to impose and reproduce itself in this phase of social reproduction 
without encountering opposition, automatically, quietly. Therefore, 
communication today is characterized by the defence of Identity, by 
reproduction of the Same, by the Totality, by Reality, by the Being. In 
a universe where everything communicates with itself, where what is 
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communicated concerns Identity and its reproduction, communication 
is emptied and silence imposed. In the relation between the interpreted 
and the interpretant there is no excess, no margin; this relation is 
realized on the basis of an identification process in which the sign’s 
escape into the interpretant ends with a return to the self, with the 
negation of what is other and the reassertion of identity.  
 
 Monologism in communication corresponds on the verbal 
level with the tendency towards monolingualism: on an external plane 
as linguistic imperialism, the imposition of one language over others; 
on an internal plane as the leveling out of language, the loss of effective 
diversity among internal languages, the loss of expressiveness to the 
benefit of easy, direct, efficient and speedy communication.  
 
 But homologation does not concern verbal language alone. It 
concerns all behaviour insofar as it is sign behaviour. To a universal 
market there corresponds universal communication which expresses the 
same needs, the same exigencies, the same desires, the same fancies. 
To “closure of the universe of discourse” there corresponds closure of 
the communicative universe in general, of the human semiosic 
universe. As Italo Calvino writes:  
 
 At times it seems to me that a pestilential epidemic has struck 
humanity in the faculty that characterizes it most, i.e. its use of the 
word. A plague of language which manifests itself as the loss of 
cognitive force and immediacy, as automatism tending to level out 
expression into the most generic and abstract formulations, to dilute 
meanings, to blunt expressive heights, to put out all flashes produced 
by words in new circumstances. But inconsistency is perhaps present 
not only in images or languages, but also in the world. This plague 
also strikes the lives of people, the history of nations, thus rendering 
all (hi)stories formless, incidental, confused [...]. My uneasiness is for 
the loss of form which I observe in life [...]. (Calvino, 1988, p. 59) 
[English translation by Susan Petrilli. Only the Italian version is in 
the bibliography] 
 
 Taciturnity is not only muteness. Taciturnity it not rejection of 
language. It is also listening, responsive comprehension, indirect 
discourse, distanced word. Kierkegaard (1843), the theoretician of the 
indirect word as reaction to the contradiction between the enormity of 
mass media and the absence of effective communication, observes that 
the direct, objective word is not concerned with otherness, with the 
other word with respect to itself, it does not constitute real and proper 
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communication, or, so to speak, it communicates silence alone (see 
Ponzio, 1992). 
 
 Taciturnity as listening and indirect speaking may consist of 
“that shifting action” exercised on language which Barthes in Leçon 
(1978) considers as a characteristic of literary writing. “The writer,” 
says Bakhtin, “is he who knows how to work on language while 
standing outside it, is he who possesses the gift of indirect speaking” 
(Bakhtin, 1959-6; Eng. trans. 1986, p. 110). Moreover, the writer, says 
Bakhtin, “clothes himself in taciturnity” (Bakhtin, 1970-71; Eng. trans. 
1986, p. 149). But this taciturnity, continues Bakhtin, “can assume 
various forms of expression, various forms of reduced laughter (irony), 
allegory, and so forth” (idem.).  
 
 Translation as indirect discourse, that is, the interpretive word 
of the word of other, and consequently translation as listening, is a 
decisive possibility of encounter with the other in current migratory and 
globalization processes. The translator as a semiotician is responsible 
for expressing the rights of others in the present situation of interaction 
among the various categories of “belonging to” and “not belonging to’, 
including resident aliens, guest workers, immigrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees. Translation and sign interpretation play a decisive role 
not only in communication between one culture, with its verbal and 
non-verbal languages, and another, but also in the possibility of the rise 
of transnational subjectivities for which human rights are also the rights 
of others.  
 
3. Semioethics of translation (by Susan Petrilli) 
 
The term “semioethics” (see Petrilli and Ponzio, 2003, 2005) refers to 
an orientation necessary today more than ever before in the context of 
globalization, for a better understanding of semiosis–its implications, 
perspectives, the risks involved and responsibilities. “Semioethics” 
indicates the propensity of semiotics to recover its ancient vocation as 
“semeiotics” (or symptomatology), which focuses on symptoms. In 
other words, a major issue for semioethics is “care for life” in a global 
perspective according to which semiosis and life coincide. 
 
 The expression “global or globalized communication” has 
different meanings. Our focus is on communication as it characterizes 
society today in social, cultural, economic and political terms. In the 
present context it refers to a characteristic socio-semiosic phenomenon 
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of our time: communication developed by technology, supported by the 
market and market logic, and extended over the entire globe. All this is 
directly connected with the production system called “capitalism” in its 
current phase of development–the global communication-production 
phase (in technology and knowledge society).  
 
 Globalization can be understood in both socio-economic and 
semiotic terms: therefore the expression “global communication” has 
two different sets of meanings and ideological values depending on 
whether it is understood as referring to the socio-economic perspective 
or to the semiotic perspective. The socio-economic perspective of 
globalization is limited and short-sighted, as paradoxical as this may 
seem, given that it serves sectorial and egotistical interests. On the 
contrary, the semiotic perspective evidences the condition of reciprocal 
involvement and interrelatedness of all life forms on the planet. And 
the condition of interrelatedness implies that in the long run 
indifference towards the other, the tendency to oppress the other, can 
only backfire on the oppressor.  
 
 From the point of view of anthroposemiosis, we juxtapose the 
nonfunctional to the ideology of functionality, productivity, 
competition connected to social roles and the logic of identity which 
regulates behaviour connected with roles. The human subject is such on 
the basis of anthropological and cultural nonfunctionality. Even more, 
the humanity of the human subject can only be evaluated in terms of 
the time of nonfunctionality, otherness, and excess, giving voice to 
differences which are not indifferent to each other, but which, on the 
contrary, interrelate dialogically and are reciprocally responsive to each 
other. Such qualities, orientations and values cannot be encompassed 
within roles, they cannot be reduced to social status, but, on the 
contrary, exceed and at once support the logic of roles and identities. 
No doubt, roles and identities are differentiated on the basis of the 
otherness relation, but this is a question of relative otherness, a limited 
form of otherness with boundaries necessary to the delimitation of 
one’s behaviour in relation to a given role and relative responsibilites. 
Instead, the type of otherness that cannot be restricted to roles and 
identities may be identified as absolute otherness and is connected with 
the condition of unlimited responsibility, which does not admit 
indifference. 
 
 Human life, we underline human life, is the right to otherness, 
unindifferent difference, nonfunctionality, excess with respect to a 
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world sanctioned by officialdom and convention (see Ponzio, 1997). 
The properly human converges with the capacity for absolute 
otherness, unlimited responsibility, the relation of dialogical 
intercorporeity among unindifferent differences, nonfunctionality with 
respect to the functionality of identity and relative roles. The properly 
human is the condition of vulnerability and exposition to the other. The 
places that best evidence the properly human are the places where time 
is beaten out in terms of the relation to the absolute and nonfunctional 
other; the time of death, aging, disease, of friendship and eroticism, the 
time of mothering and nurturing, the time of aesthetic discourse–
whether a question of literature, figurative arts, music, cinema and their 
signs, the time of inventiveness and scientific progress, of the play of 
musement, of the ephemeral. This is the time of excess with respect to 
closed identity, the time of dialogical detotalization and proliferation of 
differences that cannot be recruited and put at the service of the World. 
By “World” is understood the most vulgar forms of realism, dominant 
ideology, identity, being, the order of discourse, the functional subject 
with a clean conscience, the lying rhetoric of political systems or of 
mass media which are subservient to a global and totalizing world.  
 
 The multiplicity of different languages, special semioses and 
cultures flourishing in today’s world are signs of the potential for 
resistance to globalization reductively understood in terms of leveling 
of values onto global market logic, power, control (see Petrilli, 2003a, 
2003b). The connection between world, narration, history, duration, 
identity, subject, freedom, donation, conferral of sense from intentional 
consciousness, individuality, difference-indifference, interest, ontology, 
truth, force, reason, power, work, productivity, politics, war is inscribed 
in the worldview of Western culture.  
 
 This connection has been exploited and exasperated by 
capitalism from its very beginnings and ever more so now. The word is 
connected to a consciousness, a subject (whether individual or 
collective) experienced as part of the world, as the place of 
signification of the world as it is. Therefore a connection may be 
established between project, narration, ontology, signification, and 
subject.  
 
 The world is also connected with politics practiced in terms of 
totalization and functionality. The field of politics is realistic and 
implements the strategies of productivity and efficiency, it is faithful to 
reality and mediates the interest of subjects (individual and collective), 
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it orients the process of becoming according to a realistic view of the 
present.  
 
 The world as it is, the present, is defended at all costs, even at 
the cost of the extrema ratio of war which belongs to the world. Indeed, 
insofar as the world is based upon identity, it is programmed for 
sacrifice of the other in the name of identity. From this perspective 
peace is no more than an interval, momentary repose, reintegration of 
forces, respite from war, preparation for the next war, similarly to rest, 
free-time, the night necessary for the resumption of work, for the 
“madness of the day” (Blanchot). Peace flourishes in and for war, 
similarly to rest and the night, which flourish in and for work, for the 
day. 
 
3.1. Migration and alterity 
 
Unlike emigration, migration cannot be controlled and contained and 
does not arise as the transfer of labour-force which as much as it may 
be an antagonist to capital is a complementary part of it. Migration is 
the displacement of human beings who arrive in large numbers from 
underdeveloped areas in the world and request hospitality from 
developed countries. Their request is for a place to live in and not just a 
work-place. To request hospitality is also to interrogate those people 
who instead do have a place in the developed world (and not just a 
work-place). To request hospitality from these people means to request 
that they justify themselves, which means to request justification from 
those who have a place in the world and have never had to account for 
their privilege. 
 
 In the case of migration, alterity is not the alterity of labour-
force (which is relative alterity, internal to the community, or if 
external to the community, it can be absorbed by that community) 
which requests and interrogates, but absolute alterity. With its request 
for hospitality, absolute alterity questions identity. However, this 
request cannot be registered, it cannot be acknowledged, it resounds 
like an accusation, even if this is not the intention. In fact, the request 
for hospitality evidences a bad conscience in the good conscience of 
identity, it evidences those characteristics of the capitalist system that 
are preferably ignored: underdevelopment, oppression, segregation, 
poverty, famine, illness, death, war–all being irreducible excesses of 
this same system.  
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 The request for hospitality made by migration comes from an 
alterity that cannot be assimilated by the community–this is an absolute 
request made by those who in Italy are indicated as the so-called 
“extracomunitario,” in English “extracommunitarian” (a concept and 
reality indicated with such expressions as “illegal aliens” or simply 
“illegals”). The request for hospitality cannot be translated into the 
request for a work-place or a job, it cannot be assimilated to the request 
made by the unemployed; instead it is a request made by those who 
cannot find a place in the totality, in the order of the identical: a request 
made by those who cannot be assimilated by the dialectics internal to 
the identity of capital: a request made by absolute alterity which does 
not fit the preordained plan of monologic dialectics, but rather is 
exposure to the risk of dialogic dialectics. 
 
 The request for hospitality made by the absolute alterity of 
migration is not made in the name of “human rights.” Human rights as 
traditionally understood mostly correspond to the rights of identity. 
Instead, our focus is on the rights of alterity, the rights of the other 
human being, autrui, to say it with Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), 
the rights of difference. But this is difference that does not belong to a 
genre, a group or class of some sort, a community; difference that is not 
relative, that is not internal to community identity and its dialectics. 
Instead, the type of difference foreseen by the humanism of alterity is 
characteristic of the extracommunitarian. The rights of the 
extracommunitarian also need to be translated into the declaration of 
“human rights’. His/her word calls for translation understood in terms 
of hospitality; his/her existence calls for listening, for understanding of 
his/her irreducibility to the system, consequently for transformation of 
this very same system.  
 
3.2. Human rights and the rights of others  
 
The question we must ask is that posed by Levinas: is there no other 
sense for being than being in the world and for the world? Can the 
properly human transcend the space and time of objects, the space-time 
of identity? Do such relations exist that cannot be reduced to the 
category of identity, such that are alien from relations between subject 
and object, from relations of exchange, equivalence, functionality, 
interest, productivity? Do there exist such interhuman relations that are 
altogether other, yet material and earthly, to which one’s body may 
open? Does there exist a sense that is other with respect to the sense of 
objects? Throughout all his writings Levinas proposes a form of 
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humanism which is different from the humanism of identity–what we 
may propose to call the humanism of alterity (see, for example, 
Humanisme de l’autre homme, 1972).  
 
 The humanism of alterity implies “movement” without return 
to the subject, movement which Levinas calls œuvre, exposition to 
alterity, hybridization of identity, interruption of monologism and 
evasion from the subject-object relation. Hors-sujet corresponds to the 
title of a book by Levinas published in 1987; “hors-sujet” also means to 
be off the subject, not to respond to thematization, representation. This 
is possible thanks to the logic of otherness–the condition of possibility 
for a form of humanism where a good or clean conscience and human 
rights are interrogated in the light of the rights of others. The logic of 
otherness implies the capacity for critique of Western thought which 
instead legitimizes the reasons of identity, prevarication over the other, 
the reasons of war. 
 
 In front of the face of the other, the I is questioned. Through 
its nudity, exposition, fragility, the face says that alterity will never be 
eliminated. The alterity of others resists to the very point of calling for 
recourse to homicide and war (which are proof of the other’s 
irreducibility). Another one, autrui, this other, says Levinas, puts the I 
into the accusative, summoning it, questioning it, calling it back to the 
condition of absolute responsibility, outside the I’s initiative.  
 
 Absolute responsibility is responsibility for the other, 
responsibility understood as answering to the other and for the other. 
This type of responsibility allows for neither rest nor peace. Peace 
essential to war, peace intrinsic to war, a truce, is fully revealed in its 
misery and vanity in the light of absolute responsibility. The relation to 
the other is asymmetrical, unequal: the other is disproportionate with 
respect to the power and freedom of the I. Moral consciousness is the 
lack of the sense of proportion, it interrogates the freedom of the self. 
However, interrogation is constitutive of the self as much as of 
freedom, insofar as it sanctions the transition from spontaneity to 
consciousness, from freedom experienced as passive jouissance and 
happy spontaneity of self, to freedom understood as a right, and 
speaking that right. The rights and freedom of the self are established as 
a result of the need to answer to others, under the weight of unlimited 
responsibility for others.  
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 The origin of the self, an origin without arché, anarchical self, 
rises from an uneasy conscience in the face of others, a dirty 
conscience; therefore, it arises from the need to justify its presence, 
from responsibility without alibis and without escape from others. In 
the continued effort to achieve a clear conscience, the self in the 
nominative, understood as the subject, as intentional consciousness, as 
speech, derives from interrogating another self and putting it into the 
accusative. The self’s freedoms and rights (‘human rights’) also derive 
from such interrogation; they are elaborated to defend self who is 
summoned by the other to account for the rights of the other as well 
and therefore to defend itself as “I’.  
  
 All that which is realistically administered by the impersonal 
discourse of law, in the context of which war is presented as inevitable 
violence and self-sacrifice, has its otherwise in its very foundation, that 
is, in the face-to-face relation with others. This condition is even more 
realistic, indeed this time truly realistic: the face-to-face condition, as 
says Levinas, implies a relation of commandment without tyranny, 
which is not yet obedience to an impersonal law, but the indispensable 
condition for the institution of law thus conceived. 
 
 The opposition of a naked face, the opposition of disarmed 
eyes, with no protection, which gives rise to the responsibility of the 
self, is not the opposition of a force, a relation of hostility. It is peace-
loving opposition, where peace is not understood as suspension of war, 
violence withheld in order to be used more effectively. On the contrary, 
the violence perpetuated consists in eliminating this very opposition, in 
outwitting it, in ignoring the face, in avoiding the gaze. “No” is written 
on the face of the other (firstly “You shall not kill’) simply for being a 
face. Having a sense for itself, absolved from the relation with an I, a 
self, the other evades the presence of the self and its projects, does not 
go along with it. Violence is achieved by converting the no which is 
inscribed on the face of the other into hostile force or submission. 
Violence consists in prevailing over the other, to the point even of 
murder and war, in spite of opposition to violence; opposition that is 
expressed in the commandment “Thou shalt not kill’, which is 
inscribed in the face even before it is explicited in a formula. 
 
 An extrapolitical or prepolitical peace, solicitation for another 
person (see “Entretiens” in Poirié, 1987, p. 104) precedes rational 
thought, being as “I’, statements made by the subject, knowledge and 
objectifying consciousness. Primordial peace is paradoxical and 
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contradictory, it implies responsibility for peace that is otherwise from 
the peace of war (see Levinas, 1986). Primordial peace implies the 
interpersonal relationship where the subject “reaches the human 
condition assuming responsibility for the other person in the election 
that elevates it to this degree” (‘Preface” of 1990 to English translation 
of Levinas, 1934). According to Levinas, the situation of peace and 
responsibility in relation to the other, a situation where individuals give 
themselves in their singularity, difference, non-interchangeability, 
unindifference, precedes politics and logic. Politics and logic share the 
fact that they consider individuals as belonging to a genre, as equals; 
the relation of alterity is prepolitical and pre-logical. And given my 
exclusive responsibility towards every other, this relation itself obliges 
me to relate to another according to a genre, to the individual of a given 
system or group, whom as such is interchangeable, indifferent. 
Knowing, judging, doing justice, confronting two individuals in order 
to establish who is guilty, all this requires generalization through logic 
and the State, equalization of singularities with reference to a genre, 
insofar as they belong to the same State as citizens. The relationship 
with the other is mediated by institutions and juridical procedure, 
which generalizes and at the same time delimits responsibility, 
responsibility of each one of us for every other. From this type of 
generalization derives the necessity of the State. The action of the State 
is added to the work of interpersonal responsibility, responsibility as 
expected from the individual in his/her singularity (which in a sense the 
State denies). The work of interpersonal responsibility is the work of 
the individual in his/her singularity, of the person who is responsible in 
an absolute sense: responsible like a hostage who must answer for 
something s/he did not do, for a past which was never his/hers, which 
was never present to him/her (see “Entretiens’, in Poirié, 1987, p. 118). 
  
3.3. For a semioethics of translation 
 
Semioethics of translation may be considered as working towards a 
new form of humanism which cannot be separated from the question of 
otherness, what we have designated as the “humanism of alterity’. 
Human rights as they have been claimed so far tend to be oriented by 
the logic of identity, leaving aside the rights of the other. Traditionally, 
as anticipated, the expression “human rights” refers to one’s own 
rights, the rights of identity, of self, and tends to forget the rights of the 
other. On the contrary, from the perspective of concern for life (human 
and nonhuman) over the planet, for the health of semiosis generally, for 
the development of communication not only in strictly cultural terms 
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but also in broader biosemiosical terms, this tendency must quickly be 
counteracted by the humanism of alterity, where the rights of the other 
are the first to be recognized. “The rights of the other” is an expression 
that not only indicates the rights of the other beyond self, but also the 
self’s own other, the other of self. Indeed, the self characteristically 
removes, suffocates, and segregates the other, the other which is 
sacrificed to the cause of identity. But developed in such terms identity 
is fictitious and all efforts to maintain or recover it are destined to fail. 
 
 Semiotics contributes to the humanism of alterity by 
evidencing the extension and consistency of the sign network 
connecting every human being to every other, on both a synchronic and 
diachronic level. The communication network has extended worldwide 
and requires analysis in synchronic terms; furthermore, given that the 
destiny of the human species (from its most remote manifestations to 
the most recent, with reference to biological as well as historical-social 
evolution) is implied in the behaviour of the single individual, in the 
destiny of the individual, and vice versa, diachronic investigations are 
also necessary.  
 
 The sign network involves the semiosphere constructed by 
humankind, in other words, culture with its signs, symbols, artifacts, 
etc.; but if we accept the axiom that semiosis converges with life, 
global semiotics teaches us that the semiosphere is far broader than the 
sphere of human culture alone, and in fact converges with the great 
biosphere. The semio(bio)sphere is the habitat of humanity, the matrix 
whence we sprang and the stage on which we are destined to act. 
 
 Semiotics has demonstrated that whatever is human involves 
signs. Indeed, from a global semiotic perspective we now know that 
whatever is simply alive involves signs. This is as far as cognitive 
semiotics and global semiotics reach. However, semioethics pushes this 
awareness even farther by relating semiosis to values. Semioethics 
focuses on the question of responsibility, of radical, inescapable 
responsibility inscribed in our bodies insofar as we are “semiotic 
animals.” As human beings we are responsible for life over the entire 
planet. This also leads us to interpret the sign behaviour of humanity in 
the light of the hypothesis that if the human involves signs, signs in 
turn are human. However, a humanistic commitment does not mean 
reasserting humanity’s (monological) identity yet again, nor proposing 
yet another form of anthropocentrism. On the contrary, what is implied 
is radical decentralization, nothing less than a Copernican revolution. 
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As Welby would say, “geocentrism” must be superceded, even 
“heliocentrism” until we approximate a truly cosmic perspective where 
global semiotics and semioethics intersect. Otherness more than 
anything else is at stake when it is a question of responsibility, 
therefore of humanism understood as the humanism of alterity. It 
should also be underlined that by “otherness” is understood not only 
the otherness of our neighbour, or even of another person at a distance–
though now relatively so given the worldwide expansion of the 
communication network–, but also the otherness of living beings most 
distant from us in genetic terms. 
 
Reformulating a famous saying by Terence (“homo sum: 
umani nihil a me alienum puto”), Roman Jakobson asserts that: 
“linguista sum: linguistici nihil a me alienum puto.” This commitment 
by the semiotician to all that is linguistic, indeed, to all that is sign 
material (not only relative to anthroposemiosis or more extensively to 
zoosemiosis, but to the whole semiobiosphere) is not only intended in a 
cognitive sense, but also in an ethical sense. Such a commitment 
involves concern for the other, not only in the sense of “to be 
concerned with...’, but also in the sense of “to be concerned for...’, “to 
care for...’. Indeed, viewed from such a perspective, concern for the 
other, care for the other imply a capacity for responsibility without 
limitations of belonging, proximity, or community. In truth this 
capacity is not exclusive to the “linguist” or “semiotician’. Developing 
Jakobson’s intuition, we could claim that it is not as professional 
linguists or semioticians, but more significantly as human beings that 
no sign is “a me alienum’. Leaving the first part of Terence’s saying 
unmodified, “homo sum’, we may now continue with the statement that 
insofar as we are human beings not only are we semiosical animals 
(like all other animals), but we are also semiotic animals. From this 
point of view humans are unique by comparison to the rest of the 
animal kingdom. The consequence is that nothing semiosical, including 
the biosphere and the evolutionary cosmos whence it sprang, “a me 
alienum puto’. 
 
 From the perspective of a semioethics of translation, the 
translator is an interlocutor who does not expel the other with his/her 
singularity, cultural difference, values and specific idiom. The 
semioethic translator is a device for listening, for hospitality towards 
the word of the other. 
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 Semioethics does not have a program with intended aims and 
practices, nor a decalogue or formula to apply more or less sincerely, 
more or less hypocritically. Semioethics contrasts with stereotypes as 
much as with norms and ideology. If anything, it proposes a critique of 
stereotypes, norms and ideology, therefore of different types of value, 
for example such as those described by Charles Morris (1901-1979) in 
his book of 1964, Signification and Significance (think of his triad 
“operative value,” “conceived value,” and “object value” and 
subordinate tripartitions such as “detachment,” “dominance,” and 
“dependence”). Semioethics accounts for the human capacity for 
critique, its vocation is to evidence sign networks where it seemed that 
there were none. This means to bring to light and to evaluate 
connections and implications (which in truth cannot be avoided), where 
there seemed to exist only net separations and divisions, boundaries 
and distances, with relative alibis. Alibis serve to safeguard 
responsibility in a limited sense, that is, the individual conscience 
which readily presents itself in the form of a good conscience, a clear 
conscience. Semioethics is not fixed upon a pre-established end, an 
ultimate end or summum bonum, but rather is concerned with semiosis 
in its dialogical and detotalized globality. Indeed, semioethics pushes 
beyond the totality, outside the closure of totality, with a gaze that 
transcends the totality, a given being, a defined entity, in the direction 
of unending semiosis–a movement towards the infinite, desire of the 
other. A special task for semioethics is to unmask the illusoriness of the 
claim to the status of indifferent differences and to evidence the 
biosemiosic condition of dialogic involvement among signs, 
intercorporeity. 
 
 The critical work of semioethics helps to uncover the 
illusoriness of the condition of differences that are reciprocally 
indifferent to each other, showing instead how the planet’s destiny is 
ultimately implied in the destiny and behaviour of each and every one 
of us and vice versa. As such semioethics must necessarily begin by 
analyzing and questioning the social system from which it arises. 
Semioethics must begin from where we are today in historical-social 
terms. Its point of departure is contemporaneity with a focus on today’s 
communication-production relations, which require analysis that is 
rigorous and precise. 
 
 The task of semioethics is facilitated by the fact that 
globalized communication has reached high degrees of 
homogenization, of leveling of differences in the social reproduction 
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system. In fact, in the world of global communication-production a 
dominant production-exchange-consumption system has pervaded the 
entire planet. This has led to the worldwide spread of the same type of 
behaviour, habit, fashion (also in the sense of dress fashion), even the 
same type of imaginary, where difference understood in terms of 
otherness is replaced by difference understood in terms of mere 
alternatives.  
 
 The advantage of homogenization is that by eliminating 
diversity and difference based on the logic of otherness, there is only a 
single block to analyze. However, this advantage is short-lived for it is 
the advantage of monologism which backfires making criticism and 
creativity impossible. On the contrary, plurivocality and polylogism 
favour creative interpretation and critical questioning. Currently the 
critical task of semioethics is hindered by the fact that it does not yet 
have appropriate conceptual instruments at its disposal; adequate 
categories are yet to be constructed, and assumptions cannot be taken 
for granted when they run counter to the general orientation pervading 
today’s communication-production system. 
 
 The present day and age is characterized by migration and 
globalization processes. In this context semioethics offers translation a 
basis for the constitution of the translator as a responsible agent of 
alterity. This means that the translator is capable of safeguarding not 
only human life, but life over the entire planet.  
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ABSTRACT: Translation as Listening and Encounter with the 
Other in Migration and Globalization Processes Today ─ 
Translation is viewed from a semiotic perspective with a special focus 
on translator discourse genre and the different forms of reported 
discourse. The distinction between listening and wanting to hear and 
between silence and taciturnity is introduced to analyze the relation 
between translation and understanding, translation and the other, 
translation and hospitality, with special reference to the problematic of 
migration and globalization processes today. This leads to 
considerations on the ethical character of translation understood as 
listening, therefore on the responsibilitry of the translator towards the 
other in the encounter between different signs, languages, and cultures. 
The translator is called to account to and for the other. Given that 
translation must ultimately acknowledge the rights of others, the 
responsibility of the translator may be qualified as “semioethic 
responsibility.’ 
 
RÉSUMÉ : La traduction comme écoute et rencontre avec l’autre 
dans les processus de migration et de mondialisation ─ On 
considère la traduction du point de vue de la sémiotique, en focalisant 
le genre qu’est le discours du traducteur et les différentes formes de 
discours rapporté. On introduit la distinction entre écouter et entendre 
ce qu’on veut et entre le silence et la taciturnité pour analyser la 
relation entre la traduction et la compréhension, la traduction et l’autre, 
la traduction et l’hospitalité, en portant une attention particulière à la 
problématique des processus de migration et de mondialisation. Cette 
démarche mène à la considération du caractère éthique de la traduction 
en tant qu’écoute et par conséquent à la responsabilité du traducteur 
envers l’autre, lors de la rencontre entre différents signes, langues et 
cultures. Le traducteur doit à la fois rendre des comptes à l’autre et se 
sentir responsable de l’autre. Comme la traduction doit en dernière 
analyse reconnaître les droits de l’autre, on peut qualifier la 
responsibilité du traducteur de « responsabilité sémioéthique ». 
 
Keywords: otherness, listening, hospitality, responsibility, semioethics. 
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